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MAKE NEW PARENTS BUT KEEP THE OLD
CANDACE M. ZIERDT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nine-year old Mary Jones and seven-year old Lisa Jones have
been in foster care since their father died three years ago. Their
birth mother, Nan Jones, has a history of emotional problems and
has been unable to care for the children since the death of her
husband. It appears that Nan will not be able to care for the girls
on a full time basis at any time soon. Nan attempts to work with
the foster care workers, but because of her emotional problems,
she never seems able to completely follow through with the
reunification plans developed for her. She visits the children fairly
regularly, tries to maintain some telephone contact, and clearly
has a great deal of love for them. The social service worker cur-
rently assigned to Nan has a concern that if she obtains custody of
the girls it would only be for a short time because when Nan's
emotional problems reoccur they render her unable to care for
herself and her children.
Mary and Lisa's foster family desires to adopt them, but Nan
Jones adamantly refuses to consent to adoption. The girls would
like to be adopted, but they also want to continue to have contact
with their birth mother. They suffered a great loss when their
birth father died, and the juvenile court subsequently placed them
in foster care. Mary and Lisa are afraid of also losing their mother.
The girls are torn between the love they have for their foster par-
ents and the concern and love they have for their birth mother.
Mary and Lisa have seen a psychologist who believes it is in the
girls' best interests to be adopted so they can have a stable and
permanent home.
If Mary and Lisa's foster parents file a petition to adopt the
girls, a North Dakota judge has only two options.1 The judge can
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of North Dakota School of Law, Grand
Forks, North Dakota; LL.M., 1990, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; J.D.,
1977, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas; B.A., 1973, University of Kansas, Lawrence,
Kansas.
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-27-09 (1976). Guardianship is not included as an
alternative because many potential adoptive parents may not wish to pursue that option.
Guardianship does not accord the family relationship the same amount of permanence and
stability as adoption. While a guardian has many of the powers and responsibilities of a
parent, "a guardian is not legally obligated to provide from his own funds for the ward and
is not liable to third persons... for acts of the ward." Id. A court may require a guardian to
report on a ward's estate by its own order or upon petition of any person interested in the
minor's welfare. Additionally, a guardian may resign, or the ward, if over the age of
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terminate the mother's parental rights and allow the foster parents
to adopt the children, or she can refuse to terminate the mother's
rights and leave the children in foster care.2 What is the best
answer? Under current law can a judge craft a solution that will
protect everyone's interests3 and allow all parties to feel comforta-
ble with the result? The answer is no. This essay suggests that the
best outcome for all parties would be a "weak adoption."4 A weak
fourteen, or any interested person may file a petition for removal of the guardian. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-27-12 (1976).
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-19 (1991). A court may terminate a parent's rights in two
different ways even though both methods have the same result. The Revised Uniform
Adoption Act provides as follows:
1. The rights of a parent with reference to a child, including parental right to
control the child or to withhold consent to an adoption, may be relinquished
and the relationship of the parent and child terminated in or prior to an
adoption proceeding as provided in this section ....
3. In addition to any other proceeding provided by law, the relationship of
parent and child may be terminated by a court order issued in connection
with an adoption proceeding under this chapter on any ground provided by
other law for termination of the relationship, and in any event on the ground
(a) that the minor has been abandoned by the parent, (b) that by reason of
the misconduct, faults, or habits of the parent or the repeated and
continuous neglect or refusal of the parent, the minor is without proper
parental care and control, or subsistence, education, or other care or control
necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health or morals, or, by
reason of physical or mental incapacity the parent is unable to provide
necessary parental care for the minor, and the court finds that the conditions
and causes of the behavior, neglect, or incapacity are irremediable or will
not be remedied by the parent, and that by reason thereof the minor is
suffering or probably will suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional
harm, or (c) that in the case of a parent not having custody of a minor, his
consent is being unreasonably withheld contrary to the best interest of the
minor ....
Id.
The Uniform Juvenile Court Act also provides for the termination of parental rights by
a juvenile court who has jurisdiction over a child through the Uniform Juvenile Court Act.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1991).
The court by order may terminate the parental rights of a parent with respect to
his child if:
a. The parent has abandoned the child;
b. The child is a deprived child and the court finds that the conditions and
causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied
and that by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer
serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm; or
c. The written consent of the parent acknowledged before the court has
been given.
Id. Once a court orders a termination of parental rights the effect is clear:
An order terminating parental rights of a parent terminates all of his rights and
obligations with respect to the child and of the child to or through him arising
from the parental relationship. The parent is not thereafter entitled to notice of
proceedings for the adoption of the child by another nor has he any right to
object to the adoption or otherwise to participate in the proceedings.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-46 (1991). See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753, 769 (1982)
(stating that birthparents retain "a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction
of their family life" by a state and that before a state may completely sever those rights, due
process requires that the state prove its allegations by clear and convincing evidence).
3. This includes the birthparent(s), the foster parents, and the children's interests.
4. This is a term borrowed from German law, but seems to most adequately describe
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adoption is one that terminates most, but not all, of a birthparent's
rights to her child(ren). This situation would be similar to the non-
custodial visitation rights that courts often grant in divorce pro-
ceedings. A birthparent would still retain court ordered and
legally enforceable visitation rights, but the adoptive parents
would retain custody rights and the right to legally control the
child's behavior.
This proposal is similar to open or identified adoption in which
the birthparent(s) meet the adoptive parents and are given the
opportunity to participate in the selection process.5 Additionally,
the parties exchange identifying information and may agree to
future contact and communication.6 However, once the adoption
is final, the adoptive family generally has the final authority over
visitation and contact with the child.7 When disputes occur
between the parties, most courts permit the adoptive parents to
have total control including the right to forbid visitation by the
birth family. A few courts have permitted adoption on the condi-
tion of visitation with the birthparents,8 and some courts have
even held adoptive parents in contempt for refusing to abide by a
visitation agreement.9 Most courts, however, have held that visita-
tion rights do not survive an adoption and termination of parental
rights.10 Some courts have even gone so far as to vacate an adop-
tion decree because of a concern that it is inconsistent for a
the concept. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law
and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 46 n. 197 (1975).
The ideas in this essay were originally delivered at the 1992 North Dakota Judicial
Institute. Because this is an essay and not an exhaustive article, I only intend to present a
variety of ideas concerning the termination of parental rights and the adoption of older
children. I hope that it will stimulate further thought and discussion on the subject, and
perhaps ultimately a change in North Dakota law.
5. Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Perspectives on Open Adoption, in THE FuTURE
OF CHILDREN 119, 121 (Spring 1993).
6. Id. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15.1-01 to -07 (1991) (providing a statutory
scheme for permitting open adoptions which identifies the adoptive parents and
birthparent(s)).
7. Baran and Pannor, supra note 5, at 121.
8. See, e.g., Weinschel v. Strople, 466 A.2d 1301 (Md. 1983). In Weinschel, the birth
mother conditioned her consent to the adoption upon retaining regular visitation rights. Id.
at 1303. The court found that such a condition did not impede the adoption. Id. at 1305-06.
The court stated that visitation might even foster adoptions "in those cases where the
natural parent and adoptive parent are known to each other and the natural parent is
reluctant to yield all contact with his or her child." Id. at 1306. See also Michaud v.
Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738, 741 (Conn. 1988) (finding that a written visitation agreement
between a birth mother and adoptive parents did not violate public policy).
9. See, e.g., Loftin v. Smith 590 So. 2d 323, 323-26 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (affirming the
trial court's contempt order against adoptive parents for their refusal to abide by the post-
adoption visitation agreement).
10. See, e.g., In re M.M., 589 N.E.2d 687, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that it is
inconsistent with state law to require adoptive parents to allow a continuing relationship
between the birthparent and child); O'Quinn v. Bunkley 365 S.E.2d 460 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding that grandparent visitation rights do not survive termination of parental rights).
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birthparent to relinquish all parental rights and still retain visita-
tion rights with a child." Therefore, to effectuate this essay's pro-
posal, the statutory scheme providing for termination of parental
rights should be amended to empower a judge to order visitation
rights for a birthparent or the members of a birth family.
II. THE PERMANENCY PLANNING MOVEMENT
Under earlier law, a child welfare advocate's typical answer to
the above hypothetical question would be to terminate the
mother's parental rights so that the girls could finally achieve some
permanence and stability in their lives through adoption.' 2 With-
out the finality of adoption, the children could linger in their foster
home, never sure of when they might return home or move to yet
another foster home.' 3 The advocates worried that these children
were experiencing uncertainty and trauma due to an indefinite
and often excessive time spent in foster care.14 Because of this
concern, a new trend emerged that recommended permanency
planning for children in foster care. It attempted to reduce the
number of children in foster care by offering immediate assistance
to birth families in an initial attempt to try to keep the family
11. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 43, 51
(Spring 1993); see, e.g., In re Adoption of Topel, 571 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that contemporaneously executing a visitation agreement and a consent to
adoption by a birthparent renders the consent invalid); In re Adoption of Jennifer, 538
N.Y.S.2d 915 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1989) (finding that a noncustodial parent's consent to a
stepparent's adoption that is conditioned upon visitation is invalid).
12. During the eleven years that I practiced law, six of those years were spent working
in the Juvenile Justice Unit of Legal Aid of Western Missouri. I spent many hours litigating
termination of parental rights cases. At that time my biggest complaint about the juvenile
justice system was that it made it too difficult to terminate the rights of birthparents to their
children. It appeared that parents were given every opportunity to parent and that courts
only considered the parents' interests and rarely the childrens' interests. I argued
adamantly in favor of terminations so that children could obtain permanence and stability
in their lives instead of growing up in foster care. I worried about the many children living
in foster care for the majority of their childhood. Their only alternatives were long term
foster care or termination of parental rights and adoption. I now believe that a third
alternative should be available for the court that does not require the complete termination
of a birthparent's rights.
13. It was the discovery of "foster care drift" (children moving from foster home to
foster home while in foster care) that led to the permanency planning movement and
pressure by child welfare advocates to either terminate the rights of parents or return
children to their birth homes.
14. See Cristina Chi-Young Chou, Note, Renewing the Good Intentions of Foster Care:
Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the
Substantive Due Process Right to Safety, 46 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1993) (discussing the
passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act which Congress passed to try to
protect children in foster care and to attempt to alleviate the problem of children lost in the
foster care system).
together,'5 requiring periodic reviews of children in foster care,'"
and ultimately arguing for the rapid termination of parental
rights. 17 Terminations were considered the most important tool
because they freed a child for adoption, and adoption was pre-
ferred to other types of alternative permanent arrangements.' 8
Consequently, in the 1970s and the 1980s, child welfare advocates
emphasized the quick termination of parental rights so that chil-
dren could become secure in permanent adoptive homes. To
comprehend this drive for termination of parental rights, one
must first understand the background of the permanency planning
movement.
Josef Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit designed the
theoretical framework for the permanency planning movement in
1973, in the infamous book, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD which proposed major reform for the child welfare sys-
tem.'9 For this essay's purpose, the most relevant focus of their
message was that children needed to move out of long term foster
care or long term temporary placements and into permanent
homes that had been secured through the legal process of adop-
tion.20 This permanency planning program had two fundamental
aspects: (1) the child's needs came first, and (2) permanency in
relationships was given a paramount position in a child's needs.2 '
From these tenets, the concept of the psychological parent was
born.22 Any adult may fulfill the role of psychological parent even
though the most typical are foster parents, step parents, signifi-
cant other adults, or grandparents. 3 The permanency planning
15. Martha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 442
(1983).
16. Id. at 442-43.
17. Id. at 443.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 446. See generally JOSEF GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (1973). The authors intended that these concepts be used in both the
divorce and child welfare arenas even though domestic relations law never totally accepted
their ideas.
20. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19, at 31-39. See also Garrison, supra note 15, at 452.
21. Garrison, supra note 15, at 447.
22. "Psychological parent" refers to any adult who "through interaction,
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological . . . as well as
physical needs." Id. See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19, at 98.
23. During the last five years there have been numerous articles dealing with
alternative life styles and the concept of psychological parent(s). E.g., Elizabeth A. Delaney,
Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing the Relationship
Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 177 (1991)
(proposing a broadened definition of legal parent to include a nonbiological, unmarried
parent who has satisfied certain conditions of psychological parenthood, even though no
biological or adoptive link connects the child to that "psychological parent"); John
Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a Parent? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for
Parental Rights, 66 N. Y. U. L. REV. 353 (1991) (recognizing the need for a core meaning of
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movement asserts that in a custody dispute a psychological parent
needs complete custody and sole control over the child including
whom the child sees and how the child behaves. The reason for
giving this parent total control over the child, including her con-
tacts with other people, is due to a perceived risk of conflicting
parental loyalties. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit assert that this risk
of conflicting parental loyalties, the need to avoid the conflict, and
the potential harm to the child caused by the discord outweighs
the advantage of maintaining contact with other potential paren-
tal figure(s). 24 They suggest that permanence and stability require
the "exercise of absolute authority and receipt of unquestioned
loyalty" by the psychological parent to the exclusion of all others.'
The success of the permanency planning crusade required the
movement of children out of the foster care system. Children
needed to exit foster care either by returning to their
birthparent's homes or by being freed for adoption.26 Adoption
requires terminating the rights of those birthparents who are not
able to offer a suitable home for their child(ren) within a reason-
able amount of time.27 To achieve this goal, the federal govern-
"parent" and arguing that "those who first intend to have a child should prevail" as the
legal parent over any claim made by a birth mother); Martha Minnow, Redefining Families:
Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269 (1991) (arguing for a functional
approach in reaching a definition of parent or family and that family and parent should be
defined in terms of whether a group of people function as a family and not whether they fit
the concept of the "Leave It To Beaver" family).
24. GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 19, at 38 (arguing that children have a difficult time
relating with two psychological parents who interact negatively and that this type of
situation can produce conditions that may devastate the child and ultimately destroy the
child's relationship with both parents). See also Garrison, supra note 15, at 448.
25. Garrison, supra note 15, at 448. Interestingly, even though Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit's theories were widely accepted in the child welfare system, their proposals met with
extremely negative responses outside of the foster care context and within the divorcing
parent situation. Id. at 453. The two situations are different in that most children of
divorced parents have recently lived with both parents as opposed to a child in foster care
who may only know her parent as a visitor. Id. at 456. Further, children in foster care are
more likely to have inadequate parents. Id. But the key variable remains the same-both
have the same potential for loyalty conflicts between parent figures.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has referred approvingly to the concept of
psychological parent and a child's need for continuity and stability based on this concept.
E.g., Mansukhani v. Pailing, 318 N.W.2d. 748, 751 (N.D. 1982) ("The authors [of BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD] point out that the greatest influence on a child comes
from that person or persons the child is used to, fond of, and connected with by
experiences, memories, and identification. The person becomes the child's psychological
parent in whose care the child feels valued and wanted. With every change in this parent
figure, the child's development may regress."); Daley v. Gunville, 348 N.W.2d 441, 445
(N.D. 1984) (stating that when considering a child's best interests a court needs to consider
the psychological parents).
26. The only way to remove foster children from the system if they are not returning
home is to terminate their birthparents' rights and free the children for adoption.
27. Judith K. McKenzie, Adoption of Children with Special Needs, in THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 62, 67 (Spring 1993) (stating that the current foster care system for children
needing adoption has three aspects: reunification, preparation for adoption planning
(which includes the termination of parental rights) and finally, adoption planning).
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ment mandated periodic reviews for foster children, social welfare
agencies pressured attorneys to file more terminations, judges
granted more terminations, and fewer children entered foster
care. Consequently, by the mid 1980s there was a major reduction
in the number of children in foster care.' Unfortunately, the
number has once again increased. 429,000 children lived in foster
care in June 1992-that is a 53% increase since 1987.29 There
again needs to be a reduction in the number of children in foster
care so these children can achieve some stability in their lives.
This essay opines that the permanency planning movement's
agenda for the full termination of parental rights with its concomi-
tant focus on destroying all ties with the birthparents may no
longer be an acceptable answer to this problem.
III. WHY TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS?
Why do our laws provide a mechanism for the termination of
parental rights? In the child welfare arena, there is generally only
one reason and that is to free a minor child for adoption.3 ° The
only way a child can be adopted is to eliminate the birthparents
either by death or by the legal termination of their parental
rights.3'
The law requires the severance of the birthparents' rights
because in our society parenthood is an exclusive status, and a
child may have only one mother and one father at any given
time.32 The exclusive status granted to parenthood appears to be
based on the premise of the nuclear family.33 However, this may
now be a faulty premise. Due to increasing changes in our society,
such as divorce and the growing acceptance of unwed parents,
large numbers of children no longer live in traditional nuclear
families.34 Many children affected by these changes form attach-
28. Id. at 65.
29. Id. at 63.
30. There is rarely a reason to terminate a parent's rights unless a child is adoptable.
For example, it would be very unusual to attempt to terminate the rights of a parent to an
institutionalized child.
31. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 47 (stating that in order to free a child for adoption
there must be either voluntary parental consent or a legitimate basis for dispensing with
parental consent, such as a parent's failure to properly provide for a child).
32. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879,
879 (1984). See also infra note 42.
33. Id. at 880.
34. Id. at 880-81. Two reasons for the demise of the nuclear family seem to be the
rising number of divorces and the rising number of unmarried mothers who choose to keep
their illegitimate babies instead of relinquishing them for adoption. "'Between 1970 and
1988, the number of single parents with children under 18 in the home more than doubled
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ments to adults who are not their birthparents35 but our law
refuses to recognize these significant other adults as legal parents
if a child already has a living legal parent.36 Instead, we force
these relationships to compete with each other for legal recogni-
tion.3 7 Consequently, there are many disputed cases with a vari-
ety of parties arguing about who should acquire the parental rights
to a child.38 Unfortunately, our law permits only one set of parents
to be the "winner." Perhaps it is time to consider another option
for dealing with these situations in a more amicable fashion that
allows each significant party to preserve some form of legal rela-
tionship with the child.39 That is what this essay suggests.
IV. WHY CHANGE?
A. UNTANGLING THE PROCESS
This essay's proposal specifically concerns the pool of children
who already know their parents40 and have had some contact with
them even though perhaps only sporadic. It may be in everyone's
best interest to allow all parties to have a variety of legal relation-
ships and ties to a child. This proposal would permit a judge to
from 3.8 million to 9.4 minion." U.S. Census, Population Data, Section 16, March 15, 1990
(available in WESTLAW, DIALOG, Cendata database). This was an increase from 13% in
1970 to 21% in 1988. Id.
35. Bartlett, supra note 32, at 881. These attachments are usually to significant other
adults, foster parents, stepparents, grandparents, or other relatives.
36. Id. See also Kris Franklin, A Family Like Any Other Family: Alternative Methods
of Defining Family Law, 18 N. Y. U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1027 (1990-1991) (examining
the differences between the nuclear family and its alternatives and asserting that the
nuclear family does not accurately reflect the realities of our society and that what
constitutes "the family" has become a hotly contested political issue). See also Minow, supra
note 23 (arguing in favor of a functional notion of family).
37. Bartlett, supra note 32, at 881.
38. These usually take the form of contested adoption cases involving foster parents or
stepparents.
39. My proposal is directed toward children who already have some type of
relationship with their birthparent(s). It may not be as critical in cases dealing with infants
who have had no contact with their birthparents and have not had the opportunity to form
any kind of bond with them. A number of states, however, now permit open adoption of
infants. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40. This proposal could conceivably affect many contested termination cases. A
significant number of the termination of parental rights cases decided by the North Dakota
Supreme Court over the past twenty years involved children who knew and had some type
of a relationship with their birthparents. See, e.g., Mortenson v. Tangedahl, 317 N.W.2d 107
(N.D. 1982) (terminating the parental rights of a birth father who had lived with his
children for twelve years, but after divorce had no significant contact with them); In re
R.M.B., 402 N.W.2d 912 (N.D. 1987) (terminating a birth mother's rights to her six-year-old
daughter who had lived in foster care for several years); In re C.S., 417 N.W.2d 846 (N.D.
1988) (terminating a birth mother's rights to her three children, ages six, four and two who
had been living in foster care for a significant time); McBeth v. M.D.K., 447 N.W.2d 318
(N.D. 1989) (terminating a birth mother's rights to her two-year-old daughter who had been
involved with social services since birth); In re A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d 535 (N.D. 1989)
(terminating the birthparents' rights to their three children, ages 4 1/2, 3 1/2 and 1 1/2,
because of continuing deprivation).
grant an adoption without terminating all of the birthparents'
rights. The birthparent would retain certain legally enforceable
rights such as reasonable visitation and the right to communicate
with the child by telephone or letter. The adoptive parents would
still have sole control over the child.4 '
But why add one more alternative to an already confusing
statutory scheme?42 There are a number of reasons to consider
this addition. First, allowing a court this option may well settle a
number of contested adoption/termination of parental right cases
because parents may be more willing to consent to the termina-
tion of some of their rights instead of all of them.43 The lack of
ease in the termination process is a major obstacle to adoption.44
Many potential adoptive families may refuse to go through the
tedious court process involved in these types of cases. Addition-
ally, the dispute may psychologically damage the foster child.45
The child often does not understand the necessity of the court pro-
cess and the prolonged litigation that accompanies attempts to ter-
minate a parent's rights. Instead, it causes the child to suffer anger
and confusion.46 If all parties could agree on an adoption in which
everyone has some rights and responsibilities to the child, it may
reduce the number of contested terminations and adoptions. In
fact, it may ultimately allow more adoptions to go forward because
a birthparent may be more willing to consent to an adoption if it
does not terminate all of her rights.47
41. This is similar to a custody/visitation scenario that one sees in divorce cases.
42. See In re Adoption of K.S.H., 442 N.W.2d 417, 421 (N.D. 1989) (VandeWalle, J.,
concurring). In a case in which the court declined to terminate the parental rights of the
birth father, Justice VandeWalle stated that:
[tihe ideal solution to this problem might be statutes that would permit the
grandparents to adopt [the child] without the necessity of terminating the
natural father's parental rights. But our statutes do not permit such a solution.
Our law recognizes no more than one legal father and does not permit adoption
without termination of parental rights of the natural parent.
Id.
43. In my experience as a guardian ad litem in many contested adoption/termination
of parental right cases, it often appeared that birthparents contested the termination and
adoption not necessarily because they anticipated or even desired obtaining custody of
their child, but because they believed they loved the child and did not want the child to
think they had not fought for her. Additionally, the idea of being totally cut off from their
child was just too difficult for many parents, and they could not allow it without a battle. If a
parent, however, had a route which allowed her to keep a legal relationship with the child
instead of abandoning all of her parental rights, perhaps a parent would find it easier to
consent to the adoption. Additionally, a judge may find this to be a more palatable
situation. See supra note 42.
44. See Carol Amadio & Stuart L. Deutsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted
Children to Stay in Touch With Blood Relatives, 22 J. FAM. L. 59, 82 (1983).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (stating that prospective parents may be able to avoid long court battles if
birthparents are willing to consent to the termination of some of their rights in return for a
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B. THE BIOLOGICAL LIFELINE
Another and perhaps more compelling reason for adding this
option is that biology is often a strong source of identity for a
child.48 In many cases it may be in a child's best interests to allow
her to have some type of relationship with her birth family.
Maybe it is time to redefine our concept of the family so that it
includes a very extended family for an adopted child who has
known her parents.49 A number of cultures use adoption alterna-
tives that recognize the importance of the biological family instead
of requiring the severance of all ties with that family.5 ° French
law allows for a limited adoption as well as a regular adoption. In
the limited adoption, the adopted child remains partially con-
nected with her birth relatives, keeps a legal right to inherit from
her birth family, and has a duty to support them.5 ' In Polynesian
cultures, an adopted child knows her true parentage, and, if possi-
ble, she becomes acquainted with her birth family and any siblings
and remains welcome in her birth family's home.52 The Eskimo
culture does not conceal an adopted child's origin from her. Often
both families consider the child related to them and she continues
to maintain strong bonds with her birth family and siblings.5"
These cultures recognize the importance of biological lifelines for
adopted children.
We cannot pretend that the power of biology does not exist
for foster children. 4 There have been numerous cases and stories
of adoptees searching for their birthparents once they become
visitation order). As this essay was going to press, a Vermont court agreed to a unique
settlement in a contested adoption case between adoptive parents and a birth father. The
adoptive parents won physical custody, but they will share legal custody with the birth
father. All parties agreed that this solution was in the child's best interests. The birth
father's attorney, Peter Langrock, stated that he was unaware of any other settlements
similar to this one. An Unusual Ruling In A Custody Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, at
A28.
48. See id. at 65. See also Beyer and Mlyniec, infra note 54, at 237.
49. This extended family may include birthparents, birth grandparents, siblings,
godparents or even previous foster parents.
50. Amadio and Deutsch, supra note 44, at 64.
51. Id. (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 65.
53. Id. (citing N. CHANCE, THE ESKIMO OF NORTH ALASKA 19-20 (1966), which
discusses open adoptions practiced in the Eskimo culture where the child knows her origin
and is often able to maintain strong bonds with both biological parents and siblings).
54. During the six years that I worked with juveniles, it never ceased to amaze me that
children almost always desired to return to their biological home, regardless of how badly
they had been treated while at home. Many children yearn to be with their birth families,
even though it may mean subjecting themselves to more neglect or abuse. See also
Margaret Beyer and Wallace Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: Their Effect on
Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L. Q. 233, 237 (1986) (proposing
the birth family as a child's primary lifeline).
506 [Vol. 69:497
adults. Adult adoptees organized themselves and challenged the
confidentiality of the adoption process.55 They wanted to know
their heritage. From this mobilization, numerous search groups
formed to assist adoptees in their search to locate their
birthparents.56 If the need to find and know one's biological par-
ent is so strong for adoptees who never even knew their birth fam-
ilies, imagine how powerful it must be for children who have some
knowledge about their origins. It is time to dispel the myth that
adoption completely displaces a child's prior ties to her biological
family.5
7 
.
There must also be an acceptance of the fact that it is possible
for children to have strong psychological bonds with more than
one adult. Just because a child has a strong psychological bond
with a stepparent or other significant adult and desires to be
adopted does not mean that the child has no psychological bond
with a biological parent.5 8 Some scholars claim that a person
always has at least a psychological attachment to her birthparents
even if she had no actual relationship with them. 9 While the
courts may create a legal fiction of a new family,60 they cannot
erase memories and psychological bonds.6' They cannot, for
55. Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents of American Adoption, in THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 17, 24 (Spring 1993) (stating that the earliest group was founded in 1954 and one
of the largest and most influential groups is the Adoptee's Liberty Movement Association
(ALMA) founded in 1971).
56. Baran and Pannor, supra note 5, at 121.
57. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 49-50 (stating that the idea that "adoptive relationships
should or can substitute completely for the biological ones is now being questioned").
58. Amadio and Deutsch, supra note 44, at 75-76, citing A. SOROSKY, ET AL., THE
ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED RECORD ON ADOPTEES, BIRTH
PARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS xii-xiv (1979):
Erik Erikson described an epigenic development of identity formation in which
each period of psychological growth, from birth onward, paves the way for a
successful resolution of the classic identity crisis in late adolescence and young
adulthood. Erikson viewed the identity process as developing simultaneously
along three dimensions: psychobiological, psychosocial, and psychohistorical.
The psychobiological dimension includes the internal, psychodynamic concerns,
both at a conscious and unconscious level. The psychosocial dimension
encompasses the influences and effects of the environment, both intra and
extrafamilial. The psychohistorical dimension includes that part of man's
identity that relates to his/her sense of geniology, an existential concern that
views man as going through a cycle of life stages which are connected to the
previous and future generations through the phenomena of birth and death.
Id.
59. Amadio and Deutsch, supra note 44, at 76 (stating that this psychological
attachment is present in both healthy and troubled relationships between adoptive parents
and children).
60. The legal fiction is that the birthparents are no longer the child's parents, and the
child should erase all memories of them because she now has a "new family." Suddenly, by
court order, a child acquires new parents, a new brother and sister, and perhaps a new dog.
61. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 50 (stating that the "legal status of adoption does not
erase the history of prior relationships from the memories of older children, nor does it
resolve, by itself, the psychosocial conflicts these memories generate or perpetuate").
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example, negate the relationship that existed between an eight-
year-old child and her biological parents with whom she lived for
six years. That lifeline continues even after the adoption of a
child.62
If the parties fail to acknowledge the child's need for a biologi-
cal lifeline to her birth family, it may ultimately cause the adoption
to break down.63 The law must recognize this need for a lifeline
because it continues to survive even if a child has been separated
from her biological family for an extended time.6 Denying this
need ultimately can only harm the child.
Unfortunately, the child welfare system has not sufficiently
appreciated the importance of the birth family to the child."
Instead, it condemns the birthparent who is not able to care for
her child without realizing that the parent's failure may not be
caused by a lack of love, but by other factors such as poverty, lack
of education, mental illness, and a multitude of other problems. 6
The social welfare and juvenile justice systems need to begin view-
ing birthparents and their ties to their child(ren) differently.
Instead of deciding that because the parents failed, their rights are
suddenly subject to forfeiture, perhaps they should look at the
child's interests and determine whether the child can be placed in
a permanent adoptive home without cutting the lifeline that exists
to the biological parent.67 Some scholars consider the child's rela-
tionship with her biological parents to be so critical that:
[w]hen a child enters care in elementary school and in-
home services fail, long-term care by foster parents who
are prepared to share the child with biological parents
and who are trained to help the child resolve emotional
problems from early parental inadequacies may be pref-
erable to open adoption.68
Keeping the bond alive between birthparents and their child(ren)
may be critical for a child's psychological health. If we can accom-
62. Beyer and Mlyniec, supra note 54, at 238.
63. Id.
64. Id. See also Hollinger, supra note 11, at 50 (stating that even infants enter adoptive
relationships with biological bonds).
65. Beyer and Mlyniec, supra note 54, at 239. See also Bartlett, supra note 32, at 907.
66. Beyer and Mlyniec, supra note 54, at 239-240.
67. This is assuming that a determination has been made that the child can not be
reunited with her birth family in the near future and that she needs some permanence in
her life that will only be realized through an adoption. Otherwise, "'[a] barely adequate
biological parent is preferable to an excellent foster or adoptive parent for the school-age
child who has a relationship with the natural family." Id. at 242.
68. Id. at 248.
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plish this and allow an adoption at the same time it may be in a
child's best interest.
Many states, including North Dakota, require a judge to con-
sider a child's best interests in an adoption proceeding.6 9 Previ-
ously, advocates for the permanency planning movement argued
that a child's best interests would best be served by moving her
into a permanent home, severing all ties with her birthparents,
giving her some stability in her life and abating loyalty conflicts.7 °
Much of this was based on the maternal deprivation literature
which showed that a child's early experiences and need for psy-
chological bonding may seriously affect her development."' While
this has been generally accepted as true, there is now evidence
that suggests that there has been an overemphasis on the role of
the psychological parent.72 The permanency planning movement
concentrated on the reduction of loyalty conflicts because of a fear
that they would harm the child. Unfortunately, the research has
not focused on the amount of harm to a child caused by losing a
parent altogether,73 and that of course is the critical question in a
termination of parental rights case. Once parental rights are ter-
minated, the child effectively loses her birthparent and any con-
comitant rights. Therefore, the question is whether it is in a child's
best interests to have a visiting parent that she may never live
with or no parent, 4
As previously stated, one of the main reasons voiced by the
permanency planning movement for severing parental rights was
to reduce a child's loyalty conflicts. Recent research, however,
shows that severing relations with parents or caretakers will not
necessarily resolve a child's loyalty conflicts.75 Research shows
that continued contact between birthparents and their children in
foster care generally makes the children feel more secure and bet-
ter about themselves.7 This is true even for children who were
separated from their birth family at a very young age and who
only have irregular contacts with their parents after the separa-
tion.77 An early study critically examined the level of emotional
69. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-13(3) (1991) (requiring a court to consider a
child's best interests in an adoption proceeding).
70. See Garrison, supra note 15, at 442-49.
71. Id. at 458.
72. Id. at 459.
73. Id. at 460.
74. Id. at 461.
75. Bartlett, supra note 32, at 907.
76. Garrison, supra note 15, at 461.
77. Id.
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security exhibited by foster children and found that children who
stayed in contact with previous foster homes were more secure
than children who did not have that sort of contact.78 Another
study found that children who received small gifts or letters from
their mothers were more self-confident, and preserving ties with a
birthparent actually furthered the children's relationship with
their foster parents.79  More recent research revealed the
following:
[O]f 61 foster children age five and older who had been in
care for at least one year, the highest level of well-being
occurred in those who identified with their natural par-
ents and whose parents visited them; the second highest
level occurred in children who identified with foster par-
ents and whose natural parents visited them; much lower
levels of well-being occurred in children who identified
with foster parents and whose natural parents did not
visit them. Because half of the children in this last cate-
gory had spent most of their lives in their current foster
home, the study strongly supports the notion that perma-
nent custody arrangements that permit continued con-
tact between the child and his natural parent are
preferable to absolute termination of parental rights.8 0
It is significant that all of the foster care research reveals that
continued contact between birthparents and their children in fos-
ter care had a positive effect on the children.8 ' More important,
the studies found that even infrequent visits benefited the chil-
dren.8 2 It appears that a child will benefit much more by living in
an environment which encourages her to accept her birthparents
as unable (but not necessarily unwilling) to care for her.8 3 The
data seems to suggest that a visiting parent, even if the visits are
only sporadic, may be better than no parent.84 Perhaps to assist
these children to realize their full potential we need to help them
78. Id.
79. Id. at 461-62.
80. Id. (citations omitted).
81. Garrison, supra note 15, at 463 (citations omitted). But see Marianne Berry, Risks
and Benefits of Open Adoption, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 125 (Spring 1993) (stating
that the effects of open adoption of infants are still murky and that there needs to be further
research before concluding that open adoption is totally beneficial to the adoptee). The
studies in Berry's article, however, relate more to infant adoptions than to the adoptions of
older children.
82. Garrison, supra note 15, at 464.
83. Id. at 465.
84. Id. at 467.
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accept whatever love the birthparent is able to give. This will be a
very difficult task if a court terminates all of the parents' rights to a
child and essentially tells the child that her birthparents are too
unfit to ever parent her. A child may receive more benefit from a
realization that although her parent is not able to care for her on a
full time basis, the parent loves her and wishes to continue some
type of relationship with her."5 Perhaps it is time to realize that
many adults have the capability to parent a child in a variety of
ways 6 and that children will be better served once the law
accepts this premise.
V. A SYSTEM RIPE FOR CHANGE
There already has been a recognition in certain areas of the
law that the ideal of the All-American or nuclear family no longer
exists. In family law, exclusive parenthood is rarely the norm, 7
and the child welfare system needs to draw upon its experience
and start to recognize that children may have important relation-
ships with a number of adults. Family law courts recognize the
need to go beyond this concept of exclusive parenthood in divorce
and child custody cases.8 8 One commentator argues that judicial
decisions in the divorce area could be extremely helpful to courts
that are deciding termination cases.89 Family law has consistently
recognized the importance of the child-parent relationship and
has strived to ensure at least visitation rights for the parent who
does not have custody.90
Over the last decade, family courts have seen an evolution in
the area of child custody upon divorce. Child welfare law may be
able to learn from this evolution. Courts now recognize a variety
of split or joint custody arrangements that were previously unac-
85. This is not an argument that the complete termination of parental rights is never
appropriate. Certainly in some cases, especially of infants and young mothers, it may be in
the best interests of both. Also, young children of extremely abusive parents or of parents
with very severe mental disturbances may find parental visitation too threatening. Some
parents with severe emotional disturbances may be incapable of any meaningful
interaction. But, absent extraordinary circumstances, the court should have the option of
allowing an adoption along with court ordered visitation by the birthparent(s).
86. This could include a multitude of variations. For example, a child might have three
mothers-a foster mother, a birth mother, and a step mother-and each one of these
women will have the potential to offer something to a child.
87. See Bartlett, supra note 32, at 899.
88. In joint custody cases, the courts specifically recognize the importance of both
birthparents.
89. See Garrison, supra note 15, at 478.
90. See id. (discussing the difference between divorce decisions and termination
decisions but recognizing them as related problems and seeing a need to bring the" 'family
law of the poor' [the child welfare system] into alignment with 'private family law'" so that
poor people are treated equally).
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ceptable, and almost all states now permit some form of joint cus-
tody arrangement. 9 The reason for permitting these types of
dispositions seems to be a recognition that a child may have bonds
and special relationships with a number of different adults and
that both parents are important to a child even if visitation with
them creates loyalty conflicts.
Additionally, many states are acknowledging the importance
of birth families by passing legislation that grants visitation rights
to noncustodial grandparents.92 As long as a child is in a stable
adoptive home and has help from her adoptive parents, she may
be able to actually benefit from multiple relationships. 93 It is time
to recognize that in certain situations courts should not have to
choose one set of parents over another. Instead, the legislature
needs to create a middle ground that permits both the adoptive
parents and birthparents to continue some type of parental ties
with the child.94
VI. DRAWBACKS
What are some of the major drawbacks to this suggestion?
Several leap to mind. The first concern is that potential adoptive
parents often may not be willing to adopt children under these
types of circumstances because it may intensify any feelings of
insecurity they have about the adoption process.95 Adoptive par-
ents may worry about their entitlement to have and control the
adopted child.96 They may fear that the birthparents will try to
disrupt the placement. However, with the adoption of children
who have been through the foster care system, it seems that there
is a much slighter chance that a birthparent would try to disrupt
the placement. The birthparent would know that most of her
parental rights had been terminated already and that she only
91. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17 subd. 2 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-4-222 (1991); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2) (West 1993).
92. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993) (permitting grandparents and great
grandparents of an unmarried minor to acquire visitation rights if it is in a child's best
interest, unless the child has been adopted by someone other than a stepparent or
grandparent).
93. Bartlett, supra note 32, at 910-11.
94. Id. at 944.
95. Berry, supra note 81, at 128.
96. Id. The recent DeBoer case dramatically illustrates the potential conflict between
adoptive parents and birthparents, and shows why adoptive parents may worry about their
ability to keep custody of a child. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 62 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. July 30, 1993)
(forcing adoptive parents to return their adopted daughter to her birthparents after two
years of litigation). But note this case involved an infant adoption and not the adoption of
an older child.
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retained visitation rights as long as it was in the child's best
interests.
Another criticism is that this type of situation may only con-
fuse the adopted child so that she will not be able to deal with the
differing value systems among multiple parents and any resulting
loyalty conflicts.97 Several courts have assumed that allowing visi-
tation between birthparents and an adopted child would only
cause great confusion for the child.98 However, there seems to be
general agreement that if the relationship between birthparents
and adoptive parents is clear and positive then the child will be
least confused about loyalties.99
One other possible criticism is that this option will deplete
more judicial resources because it gives a birthparent a statutory
right to court enforced visitation-something she would not nor-
mally have after the termination of her parental rights.'0 0 At least
one scholar postulates that enforcing visitation for birthparents
would not consume a substantially greater amount of judicial
resources than are currently being used because this situation is
not as likely to have the type of personal conflict that one often
sees in domestic relation cases. 10 1 Hopefully, the parties would be
more willing and able to work out any potential problems. Addi-
tionally, the types of cases that come to court would involve the
type of fact patterns that domestic relation courts are used to han-
dling, and they could be directed by the family law already
developed.10 2
The current laws are devised largely for traditional infant
adoptions and not for older children who know their birth family,
live in the same town as they do, and will likely continue to have
contact with the birth family.'0 3 In order to deal with this differ-
ent pool of older children, there needs to be another alterna-
tive.' 4 This alternative should be provided for by statutory
amendment because the courts have responded to these disputes
in a variety of ways.
In determining whether a family is appropriate for a weak
97. Id. at 129.
98. Id. See supra note 10.
99. Berry, supra note 81, at 129.
100. Garrison, supra note 15, at 479.
101. Id. at 480.
102. Id.
103. Beyer and Mlyniec, supra note 54, at 251.
104. Judy E. Nathan, Visitation after Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59 N.
Y. U. L. REV. 633 (1984) (discussing statutory visitation rights of birthparents and other
relatives both before and after adoption).
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adoption, a judge may need to consider the reasons why a parent is
unable to ever regain custody, whether the parties were willing to
try to work together and whether there is any evidence that con-
tinuing biological ties with the birth family would be harmful to
the child. Once a judge decides that continuing those ties is in a
child's best interests, then she should be able to grant a weak adop-
tion that permits these types of relationships.
VII. CONCLUSION
The real issue here is what is the basic goal of the system? Do
we want to punish the parents and accordingly deprive them of
their rights? Do we want to protect the child and do whatever is
in her best interests? Should the focus in a termination of parental
rights case be on the conduct of the birthparents and on whether
they are unfit or should it be aimed at trying to determine what is
in the best interests of the child? Should it perhaps encompass
both? The proposal presented in this essay would allow judges, in
appropriate situations, to actually do what is in a child's best
interests.
514 [Vol. 69:497
